Factors underlying students’ appropriate or inappropriate use of scholarly sources in academic writing, and instructors’ responses

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ABSTRACT

At first glance it is surprising that – in remarkable contrast to grammatical or lexical failings which, while certainly not viewed as insignificant, are rarely greeted with outright anger or hostility – inappropriate documentation of scholarly sources so frequently provokes very harsh penalties. Rather than the constructively pedagogical approach that one would expect with regard to other defects in writing, why do we so often witness a rush to negative evaluation of what may, after all, be evidence of nothing more culpable than misinformation, confusion, or oversight? Much has of course been written about possible remedies for ineffective use of scholarly sources and, on the other hand, about available monitoring and punishment for deliberate plagiarism; so, in a sense, the alternatives appear quite simple. However, decisions about when to adopt a more pedagogical or a more disciplinary viewpoint are complicated by difficult and potentially emotional factors that can disrupt calm, confident and well-reasoned judgment. Thus, this paper will focus not on pedagogical or disciplinary strategies, whichever may be considered suitable in a given case, but on a framework for thorough reflection earlier in the thinking process. It will explore multiple perspectives on possible origins for the innocent if maladroit mishandling of scholarly sources, with a view to highlighting a number of informative but potentially neglected reference points – a cognitive psychological perspective on human error and error management, plausible ambiguities in determining what actually constitutes plagiarism, and communication challenges – that may enter into the instructor’s final determination.

Keywords: Plagiarism; human error; cognition; patch writing; innovation

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Introduction

To echo Shakespeare’s well-known observation about true love, the course of understanding and appropriately using scholarly sources never did run smooth. Difficulties confront not only students attempting to master and employ the necessary conventions, but also instructors struggling to explain and enforce them. Indeed, especially in first- or second-year university courses that entail an element of written work, considerable effort may be devoted to elucidating, teaching, monitoring, rewarding and even policing the various forms of academically acceptable paraphrase, quotation, and general reliance on scholarly sources. Naturally, these important endeavors have attracted considerable scholarly attention, but we should also bear in mind additional aspects of the question, which may arise prior to or after recommendations for best pedagogical practices as such. These include criteria for separating culpably from innocently unacceptable use of sources, and strategies to promote wide adoption of the most constructive viewpoints on the issue. Although, as the following pages will make plain, very interesting work in this area is already available, there is reason to believe that more can be done. Thus, the purpose of this discussion is to propose an innovative, more comprehensive framework for reflecting on students’ appropriate or inappropriate use of scholarly sources in academic writing.1

At the outset, it is worth drawing attention to the anger, hostility, and harsh penalties that students’ inappropriate documentation of scholarly sources so frequently provokes, a reaction that contrasts with the more temperate and constructive response that typically greets other errors in written work, such as those involving syntactical or lexical inaccuracies. While it is obvious that deliberate efforts at deception deserve commensurate discipline, there is also room for hearing students’ protestation that their alleged transgression was the result of innocent misinformation, confusion, or oversight. Moreover, to be even-handed, we should ponder the sobering possibility that fully comprehending all implications of the intricate process of using sources acceptably – or sliding into unacceptable practice – can on occasion tax the discernment not only of learners but also of their teachers, no matter how faithfully either attempts to address the issue. Although there is nothing to gain from adopting a stance of facile relativism, our insight into this phenomenon may become subtler, better-reasoned, and therefore also more decisive through a review of certain informative but potentially neglected perspectives: notably, the cognitive underpinnings of human error and its possible reduction; plausible ambiguities around determining what actually constitutes plagiarism; and communication challenges that may inject an emotional element into what is already the very difficult task of responding appropriately to unsatisfactory use of academic sources. For the sake of initial simplicity, these matters will be taken up separately and in succession, but of course they are not entirely independent of each other. Thus, connections among them will be highlighted as they emerge along the way.

Human Error in General

James Reason has, over a number of years, developed a very thought-provoking framework for thinking about the cognitive process of human error, first elaborated at length in Reason (1990), and revisited in Reason and Hobbs (2003). For Reason, it is essential to seek a psychological model that can explicate “not only correct performance, but also the more predictable varieties of human fallibility” (1990, p. 1), and he argues that study of real-life error patterns can give rise to “more global theories of cognitive control than are usually derived from laboratory experiments”1

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1 It is important to note that, although various forms of academic dishonesty are often discussed together, the focus of this paper is specifically on plagiarism in the form of culpably inadequate paraphrase.
Reason’s impressive findings focus especially on “the terrible cost of human error” in such realms as aviation, power generation, and industry (1990, p. 1); he certainly does not directly address the issue of academic error in the use of scholarly sources. Still, it is encouraging to note Reason’s assertion that “errors appear in very similar guises across a wide variety of mental activities” (1990, p. 2), and in fact many of his illustrations come from outside the domain of “high-risk technologies” of most concern to him (1990, p. 248). On that basis, there are grounds for judiciously applying key elements of his basic framework for the purpose of elucidating the matter at hand: factors underlying students’ and instructors’ decisions around the use and reporting of academic sources.

Reason divides human errors into two categories. “Slips and lapses” result from “some failure in the execution” of a habitual move that actually is based on a perfectly acceptable intention. By contrast, “[m]istakes” stem from “deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or inferential processes” leading to an intended course of action that is therefore defective in itself (1990, p. 9). Although the details of the proposed framework extend further, this initial contrast is already very important when evaluating possible academic misconduct because, “[t]he notions of intention and error are inseparable” in the sense that moral or criminal responsibility for a misstep depends on the “will” of the actor (1990, pp. 5, 7). In other words, it may be difficult to attach guilt to an action that was committed unintentionally, which is, of course, an excuse that one often hears. But this will receive more attention later. For the moment, we should note that the above distinction also opens the way to a different sort of complication: Reason observes that “mistakes are likely to be more subtle, more complex and less well understood than slips” and that “[b]y their nature, mistakes are also far harder to detect” (1990, p. 9).

The above gradation of complexity and fugitivity – with simple skilled-based (SB) slips or lapses classified as easier both to perceive and to understand – is succeeded by a further discrimination, between “rule-based” (RB) and “knowledge-based” (KB) mistakes (Reason, 1990, p. 53). This sets up a three-level progression, succinctly categorizable as focusing on “routine tasks”, “trained-for problems”, and “novel problems” (Reason & Hobbs, 2003, pp. 28-9). SB performance is identified as “primarily a way of dealing with routine and unproblematic activities in familiar situations”, where there is in fact no perceived difficulty, whereas RB performance only enters the picture after there is “awareness that a problem exists” (1990. p. 56). Thus, elements of effort and stress gradually begin to appear at the RB level because, although in some respects RB resembles SB performance – since both are associated with reliance on a “repertoire” of accumulated experience that can make action seem relatively smooth-flowing (1990, p. 57) – RB problem solving, additionally, requires deliberate selection among “well-tried ‘troubleshooting’ rules” (1990, p. 57). This increase in exertion is further magnified at the KB level, where there are no more ready-made routines or rules, and “an adequate path to a desired goal is something that lies ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered by the problem solver. Apart from inspired guesses, the only way forward is by trial and error” (1990, p. 158).

The RB and the KB levels of performance also partially resemble each other – with mistakes at either level – “the actions may run according to plan, but … the plan is inadequate” (Reason, 1990, p. 53). However, the explanation differs by level: RB problem solving may go wrong if an unsuitable rule is chosen from among those on file, whereas with KB problem solving the actor is “forced to resort to intentional processing” in “largely uncharted territory” (1990, pp. 57). Consequently, it is not surprising that SB performance, when available, is the preferred mode because it is so comfortably “automatic” (1990, pp. 56, 57), nor that KB performance is distinguishable from both SB and RB because it is significantly “more effortful” than either (1990, p. 67).

The boundary between RB and KB problem solving is important; movement from RB up to KB – as well as the temptation to move from KB back down to SB as soon as possible – deserves
particular attention. Among the psychological foundations for his model of error – also including frame theory, script theory, and memory organizing packets – Reason refers to schema theory (1990, pp. 25-6, 51-2, 33-6), which of course is very familiar to applied linguists, and which underpins his observation that both admirable expert performance and lamentable error may flow from the same core principle that “human beings are furious pattern matchers” with a strong propensity to “exploit the parallel and automatic operations of specialized, pre-established processing units” (1990, p. 66). As a result, “human beings are strongly biased to search for …a prepackaged solution at the RB level before resorting to the far more effortful KB level, even when the latter is demanded at the outset” (1990, p. 65, emphasis in original). In Reason’s view, KB performance – including KB mistakes, when they occur – can be clearly differentiated from RB in that KB performance “occurs when the problem solver realizes that none of his [or her] rule-based solutions is adequate to cope with the problem” (1990, p. 67).

As will appear in more detail throughout this discussion, the preceding points seem relevant not only to learners but also to teachers. Without falling into the trap of “squishily relativistic” laxness (Mallon, 1989, p. 99), we should bear in mind the obvious fact that decision making about suspected plagiarism can entail extremely negative outcomes. The burden of responsibility is therefore as real for us in the classroom as it is for the managers and technicians whom Reason studies in industrial settings; thus, as a foundation for due diligence, we need to entertain a number of probing questions. Most immediately, just confining ourselves to the matter of students’ academic conduct, we should review three typical excuses – or perhaps acceptable explanations – for paraphrasing practices that may in fact not be blameworthy even if they are faulty: unawareness at the time of the action, circumstantial factors, and unclear understanding of expectations.

a) Claimed unawareness of error until after the fact

Especially when phrase-matching software is used, multiple small matches sometimes appear throughout an essay, a pattern that students may readily recognize if it is later drawn to their attention. This might reflect “patchwriting”, which could be viewed either as an attempt to evade charges of plagiarism by making just trivial changes in the source text, or as an inept but honest effort “to observe proper academic conventions” (Howard, 1993, pp. 234, 236). Either way, the behaviour would be a more or less deliberate, but the apparent intention – and probably the consequences – would differ significantly. However, one difficulty still remains: can students really be unaware of doing something that, afterwards, they can readily perceive, especially when they have perhaps had the matter drawn to their attention before? A learner claiming to be in that situation might of course be insincere but, on the other hand, the answer to the question might well be yes.

Reason notes that error may result from the “intrusion” of a habitual routine (1990, p. 68) that, although not suited to the specific circumstances, can encroach inappropriately on account of its “high frequency of … prior use” (Reason, 1990, p. 108), and in fact this effect has been observed in interviews with students who had run into problems: “In some cases student understandings developed prior to university seemed to take precedence over the message we had been delivering about plagiarism” (Ireland & English, 2009, p. 10). Thus, patchwriting could be a familiar strategy for “entry-level manipulation of new ideas and vocabulary” (Howard, 1993, p. 233) that is difficult to banish after it has outlived its utility. In a slightly different way, such a mechanism might even help explain “cryptomnesia, or unconscious plagiarism” (Roig, 2001, p. 308), associated with unintended copying of parts of a very well-known text, and – especially in connection with patchwriting – we should note Reason’s assertion that ingrained SB or RB routines are “largely automatic”, unfolding in a “mainly unconscious” manner (Reason, 1990, p. 57; Reason & Hobbs, 2003. p. 25). Additionally, especially with SB performance, “attention capture” – i.e. distraction – is a very common error-producing phenomenon (Reason, 1990, p.
Since the attention-overwhelming demands of learning to “manipulate academic language” have been specifically implicated as a possible cause of patchwriting (Howard, 1993, p. 233), distraction should not be dismissed too lightly. Although it has been postulated that claims of unconscious plagiarism seem “more plausible” with respect to an “idea” from a source, than actual “words” (Posner, 2007, p. 99), the case for innocent patchwriting is not dismissible out of hand. And if either habit intrusion or distraction is the cause, a strictly rational KB interpretation – i.e. that the student has an actual knowledge gap regarding plagiarism (or is lying) – would ignore the potential SB or RB component of the problem: especially when the error is easy to recognize in hindsight, insufficient knowledge does not seem to be the obstacle. Instead of renewed problem-solving on the KB level, where the goal would be new information reflecting a more accurate “mental model” of the problem “at the knowledge-based level” (Reason & Hobbs, 2003, p. 28), the student might benefit more from an element of “error wisdom”: a more general set of “basic mental skills [to help performers] … recognize and, if possible, avoid situations with a high error potential” at the SB or RB level (Reason, 2004a, p. 31). Reason evocatively terms such skills “intelligent wariness” (2000, p. 395).

b) Circumstantial factors

Reason also observes that certain “latent conditions” in any system – including, we may surmise, a program or syllabus – can make it error-prone (Reason, 2000, p. 395). In the academic context, we not illogically stress time-management as an important virtue of well-organized students, but we should still be open to the important impact of simple-seeming “time pressure” (Reason, 2000, p. 395; likewise Reason & Hobbs, 2003). The risk of SB or RB errors rises with an increase in time pressure and/or another, also time-related factor, “tiredness” (Reason & Hobbs, 2003, p. 104; likewise, Reason, 2000). Although such errors are usually frustratingly apparent to the actor after the fact, unhelpful structural circumstances may make them unnecessarily difficult to avoid at the time. Reason warns against exaggerating the degree to which people really are “free agents”, which can lead to overstatements of how “obvious” it is that “an individual (or group of individuals) must have been responsible” for a given error (Reason, 2000, p. 394), when in fact error-prone circumstances could have contributed mightily. In order to take account of this kind of circumstantial influence, Reason advises an approach to accountability for error reduction that includes both a “system” and a “person” component (2000, p. 393).

c) Unclear grasp of expectations

Reason strongly emphasizes (1990, pp. 61 ff, esp. 64) that, when a difficulty arises with a usually fluent SB routine, problem-solving will move first to the RB level in an attempt to recognize the unforeseen new challenge and apply a different rule. In our case, this might involve a student’s noticing an unexpectedly negative reaction to his or her customary practice of patchwriting, possibly leading to selection of an alternate rule for more effective paraphrase. If the problem can be solved at that level, performance will return to SB. However, the student may not yet possess the necessary rule. Possibly, as Howard (1993) comments, control of fully-developed paraphrasing rules for expository texts may lag behind mastery of that principle with respect to narrative, so that the rule might as yet have little or no place in the individual’s overall conception of academic writing. In that case, in order to cope with the unanticipated situation, problem-solving must proceed to the KB level, seeking a new mental model of academic writing that accommodates integrating expository scholarly sources without patchwriting. Then, finally, if/when that can be achieved, a new rule may be established and at least a tentative return to SB performance attempted. Plainly, such a venture into KB problem solving involves much more exertion than performance at the SB level, and also considerably more than the comparatively effortless RB selection of a more suitable rule from those already in memory. Furthermore, embarking on KB problem solving will typically be triggered by disquieting “affective factors” that stem from a “complex interaction between subjective uncertainty and concern”. Thus, a
dangerously over-hasty cessation of KB processing may occur as soon as “an adequate (or apparently so) problem solution” seems available, so as to return to more comfortable SB performance (Reason, 1990, p. 67).

Overcoming such a challenge would plainly represent very significant learning progress, but it would not be easy; so, in order to support it, we need to be extremely clear about our expectations for paraphrase, quotation, and scholarly reporting in general. Yet, it has quite often been observed that criteria for paraphrase and plagiarism are potentially vague (Howard, 1993) or even inconsistent (Roig, 2001), and that point will in fact be taken up later. More immediately relevant is what Reason and Hobbs term “the paradox of expertise”, according to which, “skilled people are no longer able to describe their actions in words” even when the performance in question is as mundane as driving a screw, typing, or descending a flight of stairs (2003, p. 25). How much more arduous must be the task of explicitly describing techniques and criteria for acceptable academic writing! But such support and guidance will be crucial for students called to cross the boundary between the RB and KB levels of problem solving: when we oblige our students to enter the KB realm in order to master the features of a new writing style, we must appreciate how demanding and even painful that assignment might be. As part of the whole process of “taking on an identity” as a writer in a new academic context, appropriate referencing strategies will be more than simple rules that can be “taught or acquired just through textual features and teaching of those features or conventions” (Valentine, 2006, p. 104).

Of course, students can and do learn such brand new capacities, but – given both the novelty of the information, and the risk of curtailing the process prematurely – we must be prepared for the fact that, relative to the number of opportunities, “performance at the knowledge-based level … [is] intrinsically more error prone than at the other two levels” (Reason, 1990, p. 167), which underlines the need for excellent guidance. However, for instructors who themselves are expert writers, appropriate use of sources may be so familiar as to have become not only very difficult to describe explicitly but also – since fluent SB or RB performance is so effortless – apparently unnecessary to depict in detail because, surely, no one would require such laborious precision! As expert practitioners, we have access to “a large stock of appropriate routines to deal with a wide variety of contingencies”, with little or no conscious effort (Reason, 1990, p. 58), but this should not blind us to the possibility that novices may wrestle with seemingly elementary phases of the same process. A claim of not having understood expectations may of course be disingenuous, but it may be legitimate, too, even after repeated exhortations.

Plausible Ambiguities in Determining What Constitutes Plagiarism

Measurements and perceptions of the high frequency of plagiarism – as a specific problem in itself, or combined with other offenses under the general heading of academic dishonesty – may be taken to support the inference that appropriate paraphrasing of scholarly sources is an especially difficult challenge for students. From at least as early as the 1980s, there have been depictions of such misconduct as “one of the main problems in education today” (Singhal, 1982, p. 775), or even as “epidemic” (Haines, Dickhoff, LaBeff, & Clarke, 1986, p. 342), setting the stage for Williams’ (2001) later comment that academic dishonesty in various forms “has always been a problem for teachers” (p. 225). Certainly, the statistics for various forms of academic misconduct seem disquieting. The estimated proportion of students involved may range from 13% to 95% (McCabe & Trevino, 1997, p. 379), with a general sense that “plagiarism is on the increase” (Hayes & Introna, 2005, p. 274; similarly, Beasley, 2004, p. 2; Breen & Maassen, 2005, p. 1, and Yeo & Chien, 2007, p. 188). And while Posner (2007) muses that electronic detection systems could make plagiarism “less common” (p. 81), Walker (2010) concludes that they are not
“a comprehensive deterrent” (p. 55). Furthermore, the wider consequences are troubling: with a rate of about 25% reported even among criminal justice majors (Coston & Jenks, 1998, p. 243), there is “a possibility of dysfunction for future criminal justice practitioners” (p. 247). Thus, proactively, Nealy (2011) argues that business students should participate in problem-solving assignments around plagiarism issues as a way to discourage “unethical practices in academic and/or workplace settings” (p. 208).

In this context, we may wonder if – beyond the cognitive-processing aspect already considered – there might be other factors contributing to students’ apparently widespread difficulty with clearly grasping academic expectations around paraphrasing. In fact, a case may be made that criteria for originality, legitimate paraphrase and culpable misuse of source texts have changed confusingly over time, and to some extent remain ambiguously context-specific even today. Pennycook (1996, pp. 215-217) offers a very revealing account of historical changes in views about originality, authorship and plagiarism, which has become a common theme: e.g. Howard (2000, pp. 83-4), Whitely and Keith-Spiegel (2002, p. 21), or Valentine (2006, p. 91). Some, like Valentine (2006), detect a turning point in “the late nineteenth century” (p. 91, similarly Hoffer, 2004, pp. 22, 26); others, like Mallon (1989), identify a more gradual “sea change” beginning as early as the 1500s in England (p. 5; similarly, Sutherland-Smith, 2010, p. 5). More expansively, Roberts (2011) claims that plagiarism is “as old as the written word” (p. 286). In all, there is ample evidence for what Posner (2007) wryly terms “changing fashions in ‘originality’” (p. 105). Moreover, even present-day expectations can vary. While academic writers would normally be censured for representing others’ written work as their own, in the “methods sections” of medical articles “copying is widely considered not to mislead readers” (Roberts, 2011, p. 287). Also, U.S. judges routinely sign “opinions and orders” without recognizing “ghost authorship by law clerks” (Posner, 2007, p. 21). Against such a background, the least one can say is that current academic conventions for appropriate use of scholarly sources should not be assumed to be self-evident.

Moreover, studies suggest that university penalties for plagiarism are not always imposed “consistently”, so that “comparable offences” may be treated differently (de Jager & Brown, 2010, p. 515). There are repeated reports of a lack of “clarity”, “consistency” or “consensus” in instructors’ treatment of plagiarism (Hayes & Introna, 2005, p. 214; Yeo & Chien, 2007, p. 188; Evering & Moorman, 2012, p. 35). Perhaps the reason why “what counts as plagiarism, cheating or dishonesty, are variously understood” (Williams, 2001, p. 226) is that “[t]he line between a plagiarized and a nonplagiarized paper is not as clear as we might prefer” (Belter & du Pré, 2009, p. 258), making it genuinely “difficult to judge” the appropriate “cut-offs for similarity” (Roberts, 2011, p. 287). Consequently, students “are often uncertain regarding expected behavior” (Nadelson, 2007, p. 68), and may “not always [be] clear as to why certain actions constitute plagiarism” (Dawson & Overfield, 2006, p. 12). In short, if students’ views of plagiarism fail to match “the conventional perspectives of academic staff or institutions” (Elander, Pittman, Lusher, Fox, & Payne, 2010, p. 158), this may result from having received “contradictory and often ambiguous information” (Gullifer & Tyson, 2010, p. 466). And the difficulty of providing a clear theoretical elucidation appears to be obliquely recognized by initiatives to supplement formal regulations with the instructional use of suitably “anonymised” samples of actual feedback on assignments (Ireland & English, 2009, p. 11), or with hands-on analysis of concrete examples (Mott-Smith, 2011, p. 2). Overall, teachers “must not assume that college students have been taught [and have assimilated] those skills” (Ferree & Pfeifer, 2011, p. 288).

At this point, the potentially special disadvantage of nonnative speakers (NNSs) comes into focus. Plainly, international students may arrive with “a significantly different understanding of higher education” and “a different understanding of plagiarism” (Hayes & Introna, 2005, p. 225; Ireland & English, 2009, p. 5). More generally, it is of course possible for international students to encounter broadly ethnocentric misunderstanding and mistreatment (Liu, 1998). Also, in any
multicultural society, domestic “students from disadvantaged backgrounds who struggle with the demands of difficult subjects, and/or with academic discourse, in what may be a second or even a third language, find it particularly difficult to master academic literacy practices” (de Jager & Brown, 2010, p. 514). Thus, it makes sense to view problems with real or perceived plagiarism as resulting at least “in part” from “a cultural conflict” (Valentine, 2006, p. 103). And in relation to potential cultural transitions, one may recall Reason and Hobbs’ reference to the high cognitive demands to be expected whenever problem solving requires the formulation of a new “mental model” (2003, p. 28).

Certainly, glossing over this possibility would be unhelpful; for example, it seems naïve to represent simply “ensuring that all students are informed about what constitutes proper and improper academic behavior” as an adequate response to the perception that “the concept of plagiarism might … be… difficult… for some international students” (Whitley & Keith-Spiegel, 2002, pp. 21, 20). As Mott-Smith (2011) states, “teaching the definition is not enough” (p. 17), but her sage advice is probably as applicable to native speakers (NSs) as to NNSs. Evidence for NNSs particular difficulty with using scholarly sources is mixed; for instance, Ledesma (2011) reports that Korean students having already studied abroad seem to “show less of a tendency” to engage in plagiarism (p. 31) but, by contrast, Walker (2010,) notes that in New Zealand “international students have higher rates of plagiarism” (p. 5). Actually, Ireland and English (2009) comment that “both international and domestic student understandings of plagiarism are likely to be equally as varied” (p. 6; a view echoed by Pecorari, 2003), which accords with the point that Howard’s influential work on patchwriting is not confined to studies of NNSs. Thus, no doubt the best approach is to provide a clear and constructive learning experience for NSs and NNS alike.

Even so, although the dimension of potentially problematic ambiguity in defining/explaining plagiarism has received considerable study, the phenomenon of seemingly common misconduct remains. Perhaps new ways forward might be available through attention to other, different ambiguities around paraphrase and plagiarism. In particular, we could interrogate the somewhat equivocal position of patchwriting within the typical framework of subsequent-language pedagogy, the interesting theoretical relationship between paraphrasing and the separate but arguably parallel task of translation, and the possibility of alternative definitions for patchwriting/plagiarism, as something either to be avoided entirely, or simply to be monitored and managed.

d) Patchwriting in the context of ESL writing pedagogy

Is it possible that aspects of writing pedagogy could actually create a framework for patchwriting and later confusion regarding the parameters of legitimate paraphrase? The presently influential hypothesis “that SLA is largely driven by what learners pay attention to and notice in target language input” (Schmidt, 2001, pp. 3-4) has offered renewed support for a basic instructional technique with a long history: enhancing learners’ opportunities to reflect carefully on samples of authentic language. For example, one way to encourage students’ noticing of the features of effective language use may be to provide a NS “reformulation” of the learner’s written text in order to retain the meaning while improving the native-like qualities, with learners then discussing the proposed changes (Swain & Lapkin, 2002, p. 287). And, although not so authentically related to learners’ own original meanings, another somewhat similar strategy – of long standing, and still widely practiced – involves the study of model texts, often including parallel writing, as a way for learners to discover how to “relate structures to meanings” (Hyland, 2003, p.10). This technique may even include students’ actually copying source-text features in the process of “imitating the structures of the parallel text in their own essay” (p. 11). Given the need for learners to experience literally “millions” of encounters with meaningful target-language items (Grabe, 2009, p. 64), such techniques make sense. There are perfectly good reasons to highlight
the advantage of deferring to expert NS turns of phrase in the process of meeting the daunting challenge of native-like composition. Nonetheless, instructional strategies of this nature may seem to have much in common with patchwriting, as defined by Howard (1993): a resourceful technique that can seem especially attractive when tackling the “cognitively difficult challenge of summarizing exposition” that includes “unfamiliar vocabulary and concepts” (p. 239). Viewed from this perspective, patchwriting could take on the character of “a positive and not a negative trait… a way of acquiring the language of the target community” (Howard, 1993, p. 240). If so, instructors may need – as a minimum – to recognize where patchwriters’ practices originated: perhaps these students are coming from a direction where their teachers and textbooks at least in part showed them the way.

e) Relationship between paraphrasing and translation

The “paradox of expertise” (Reason & Hobbs, 2003, p. 25), already mentioned above, could lead skilful instructors – NSs or NNSs – to underestimate the sophistication of the paraphrasing ability that they possess and wish to impart to their students. As a way of stepping back a little, it may be helpful to reflect on a different but somewhat parallel undertaking: translation. Translation of course is recognized as a very difficult process deserving extended attention, sometimes being the focus of multiple courses over a period of years, but it is arguable that successful paraphrase and translation both hinge on a common (and challenging) mechanism. As conceptualized by Seleskovich (1976/1984), translation is a three-step process: first, understanding the language and concepts of the source text; then, focusing on the actual meaning; and finally, re-expressing that meaning in the code of the translated version. The key stage is the second step’s “deverbalization” of the meaning (p. 93): in order to produce a fluent and comprehensible translation, it is essential to “work from the idea [itself], stripped of its language” (1976/1984, p. 92).

Likewise, it may be inferred that an effective paraphrase – one that avoids betrayal by too-close echoes of the original source – will similarly require the writer to possess sufficient linguistic and intellectual agility to move first to and then from what Seleskovich terms the intermediary “non-verbal meaning” (1976/1984, p. 75). Such a proposed translation/paraphrase parallel is consistent with Jakobson’s (1959) model of translation, which makes room not only for “interlingual translation, or translation proper”, but also “intralingual translation, or rewording” (p. 233; emphasis in original), which is of course equivalent to paraphrasing. Moreover, a kind of intermediary process – in between paraphrase and translation – can be glimpsed in Widdowson’s (1978) distinction between a “simplified version” as distinct from a “simple account”, with the latter requiring the materials developer to work on the basis not of language but of “information abstracted from” an original source, so as to create a new “genuine instance of discourse” that will “suit a different kind of reader” (pp. 88-9). In this context, Widdowson’s emphasis on “use rather than usage” (1978, p.89) is consistent with Hatim and Mason’s (1990) view that effective translation must get beyond a “preoccupation… with… usage rather than use” (p. 33). Overall, accepting a parallel between paraphrasing and translation could contribute significantly to appreciating the complexity of fully-evolved paraphrase, and understanding the reason why patchwriting seems to linger so long.

f) Patchwriting: avoid it or manage it?

The above considerations – that patchwriting may have certain instructional saving graces, and that mastering the art of paraphrase can be expected to be a long and difficult process – could lead us to question whether there might in fact be a legitimate place for patchwriting within a responsible educational system. To answer that question, we must distinguish two very different implications of Reason’s (1990) advice that “errors are an intrinsic part of mental functioning and
cannot be eliminated‖ (p. 246). On the one hand, submitting an essay as a finished product is a very sensitive act, where a misstep could be extremely damaging. At this point in the process, students are like participants in any other high-stakes endeavour: they need to take the best possible care to reduce “the incidence of dangerous errors” and, in aid of that goal, they should adopt strategies to “contain [the]… damaging effects” of a mistake (Reason, 2000, p. 395). In this context, the wise student might take the precaution of reviewing notes or a rough draft with the instructor.

But on the other hand, there is as well the instructional context, where Reason (1990) highlights a different way of dealing with errors. In that setting, he notes that errors can “lead to self-blame” and discouragement among learners, which should of course be avoided if possible, but that in-training errors can also have “positive … effects” (Reason, 1990, pp. 245, 244). They can “spur creative problem solutions” and provide “opportunities … for further learning” (p. 244), or – as Ireland and English (2009) say in relation to learning to write – ideally, students should be able to “learn from their mistakes” and “serve an apprenticeship” in composition (pp. 3, 7). Were it not for the terrific stigma attached to anything resembling plagiarism, university educators might have little difficulty in accepting that logic. However, under pressure to uphold standards that may be largely irrelevant in the circumstances, there is a risk of insisting on test-appropriate criteria in what is actually a teaching context: in Reason’s (1990) terms, this would be the error of applying a “rule-based routine” that does have a certain justification but that simply does not match the “current situation” (p. 65). As an encouragement for instructors to consider a less rigid approach, it should be noted that Reason’s error management advice has been taken into account by all manner of highly respected professionals, including electrical engineers (Wagenaar, Hudson, & Reason, 1990), road transportation authorities (Parker, Manstead, Stradling, Reason, & Baxter, 1992), safety managers (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998), physicians and surgeons (Reason, 2000), and NASA officials (Reason, 2004b). University educators joining such a list would be in good company.

Communication Challenges

It is interesting to recall Harmer’s (2007) tart reminder that, on observing that an error has been made, instructors are best advised to exploit the event as a teachable moment, “rather than telling students off because they are wrong” (p. 138). In so saying, Harmer is of course stressing that linguistic errors are most usefully viewed as practical rather than moral defects, which seems obvious in most instances but, in the case of responses to learners who fail to use scholarly sources appropriately, it apparently is not. Evidence of moralizing reactions is readily available: Mallon (1989) refers to plagiarized words as being “kidnapped” or “imprisoned… like changelings” (p. xiv); Howard (1993) observes that plagiarism may seem “loathsome” (p. 234); the San Diego State University (2010) warning against plagiarism calls it “intellectual kidnapping”; for Pecorari (2003), plagiarism may be viewed as “a heinous crime” (p. 317); for the Eberly Center, Carnegie Mellon University (n.d.), it is “a serious crime”; and for Posner (2007), it is “the capital intellectual crime” (p. 107). And in a perhaps less scholarly but extremely vivid way, the same point is made by Isaacs (n.d.) on a class website:

Professors hate plagiarism. In fact, hate may not be nearly strong enough a word. Loathe, abhor, detest—these get closer to the real emotion. Think about it: the plagiarist not only commits theft; he or she also adds insult to injury, basically gambling that the professor is too dull or lazy to catch the infraction.

Isaacs’ reference to “theft” is specific enough to be rebutted. As Possner (2007) explains – generally in keeping with Pennycook (1996, p. 204) – in legal terms plagiarism is not stealing
because there is no “voluntary taking” of anything, although if the action also involves “copyright infringement” the situation will be different (p. 17). However, Isaacs’ mention of “insult” is surely much more to the point.

Taking seriously the suggestion that student plagiarism insults the instructor and opens up a rather interesting perspective on communication around the appropriate use of academic sources, raising the question of how to characterize the teacher’s invitation to students to submit an academic essay. Although such a request seeks a longer response than would be typical in the usual language-class exchange between instructor and learner, in a sense, such an assignment could appear to be a kind of display question: not a real-life referential question, with an actual information gap to be filled – as in the normal framework of social interaction – but a pedagogical question to which the teacher already knows the answer, asked in order to provide an occasion for the learner to display knowledge. If so, a request to demonstrate the ability to write an essay exhibiting the agreed conventions for referencing might seem to differ little from a question eliciting a display of acceptable syntax or lexis: the student’s answer might be either correct or incorrect but, even in the latter case, the error would not normally be considered discourteous. No doubt, the sticking point is the perceived element of deceit rather than error. Possner (2007), for instance, stresses that a crucial aspect of plagiarism is that it is “misleading” in the sense that it encourages illusory “reliance” on the credibility of the text and its writer (p. 19), and of course “intention” to deceive is very commonly noted as a defining characteristic of culpable plagiarism (e.g. Pennycook, 1996, p. 204; Howard, 1999, p. xxi; Pecorari, 2003, p. 38; de Jager & Brown, 2010, p. 515; Valentine, 2006, p. 94). Deliberate deception predictably will give rise to moral outrage and indeed, as Possner (2007) affirms, any form of copying that does not occasion “moral indignation” is not classified as plagiarism (p. 20).

The assignment of an essay might be identified as a form of extended display question. If so – as Markee (1995) has contended in the context of shorter, probing-type display questions, but arguably applicable in this case, too – we should note that asking a display question “presents a pedagogical opportunity for the teacher-as-expert to play a classic ‘scaffolding’ role” (p. 82). This perspective would clearly obviate any justification for feeling insulted by an incorrect answer. Thus, it is very important to explore the grounds for an instructors’ acceptance or rejection of a student’s claim of unintended error, and there is potential logic in suggesting that the “moralistic terms” in which accusations of plagiarism are often couched may in fact reflect a totally hypocritical concern for defending “authority”, rather than a zeal to penalize a genuine act of “stealing” that violates anyone’s right of “ownership” (Pennycook, 1996, p. 214). If so, such communications of outrage may be ideologically driven, designed to categorize NNSs – and perhaps NSs as well, if they “aren’t already situated in the discourses of [the particular] discipline” (Valentine, 2006, p. 96) – as “cultural Others” (Pennycook, 1996, p. 218). Accepting or rejecting a claim of unintended error could readily become the criterion for “inclusion or exclusion” (Valentine, 2006, p. 92). Such a view of the process in turn raises the possibility that the student’s intended speech act – Look, I’ve written this essay by carefully using scholarly sources! – might in fact be accidentally or even willfully misinterpreted as meaning something more like the message inferred by Isaacs: Look, I’ve hidden my illicit copying so well that you won’t be bright enough to detect it! Moreover, it must be recognized that, as discussed by Hickey (1994), bad-faith misinterpretation of speech acts is a potential everyday communication strategy that can be used in conflictual situations where the “Hearer seeks … any interpretation… which allows the utterance to be interpreted in a way that is either hostile to the Speaker or to someone else, or favourable to the Hearer” (section 4, par. 3).

Additionally, although he does not employ the sociological or linguistic terminology of a language teacher, Reason (2000) likewise envisages a quite similar risk of hypocritical communication, noting that “blaming individuals is more satisfying than targeting institutions” (p. 394). Speaking of workplace hazards – rather than academic missteps like plagiarism, although the parallel is
tantalizing – he frankly states that “seeking as much as possible to uncouple a person’s unsafe acts from any institutional responsibility is clearly in the interests of managers” (2000, p. 394), and this view is of course related to his argument that human beings are not necessarily “free agents” who are obviously and entirely “responsible” for every one of their actions (2000, p. 394), so that it would be unfair to unrealistically dissociate errors “from their system context” (Reason, 2000, p. 394) because – as already noted – when things go wrong, typically both a “system” and a “person” component will be involved (Reason, 2000, p. 393). Because he is concerned with achieving practical real-world results, Reason recommends against representing errors as “moral issues” (2000, p. 393), above all because “measures relying heavily upon exhortations and sanctions have only very limited effectiveness” and may in fact “do more harm than good” (Reason & Hobbs, 2003, p. 16). Therefore, “naming, blaming, and shaming” is a communication strategy with little real potential (Reason, 2000, p. 393), although of course very much that kind of message is encountered in relation to efforts to deter plagiarism.

Perhaps the best example is provided by Valentine (2006), who reports that “an entire town’s morality” was impugned when students at one high school were found to have plagiarized (p. 90). And like Reason, Howard (2002) stresses that it is simply impractical to adopt a moral perspective: her argument is that moralistic generalizations are liable to represent “plagiarism as a unitary act rather than a collection of disparate activities” so that – by failing to recognize unintentional and even potentially useful strategies like patchwriting – “we risk categorizing all of our students as criminals” (p. 47).

Thus, moralizing, person-oriented communication is plainly unpromising; “the traditional discourse of the law” is “only moderately successful” in formulating really effective policies for promoting academic integrity (Sutherland-Smith, 2010, p. 13). A much more profitable approach would be to follow the perspective of Reason and Hobbs (2003), who envisage an overall “system with human elements”, such that “those who manage or control the system” are responsible for arranging constructive policies on both the person and the system levels (pp. 13, 10). Obviously, these concepts of managing and controlling are somewhat out of step with the ethos of universities, where individual academic freedom is the norm. However, the gist of the advice remains valid: in place of mainly threatening communication addressed largely to students, we might better focus on devising a more effective message directed towards the overall academic community, designed to change values and practices in ways that will make a difference. This possibility elicits one final reflection: how could communication about the need for promoting academically acceptable paraphrase, quotation, and general reliance on scholarly sources be recast in order to maximize the chance of bringing about the desired changes?

g) A new model for communication

It is noteworthy that much of the communication about faulty paraphrase or apparent plagiarism emphasizes how troubling the problem is. Williams (2001) no doubt is correct in saying that “there is notable public anxiety about perceived increases in cheating and plagiarism” (p. 227), and many will agree that the problem is “extensive”, maybe even “worldwide” (Dawson & Overfield, 2006, p. 2; Yeo & Chien, 2007, p. 17). Thus, referring to it as “a considerable challenge” (Elander, Pittman, Lusher, Fox & Payne, 2010, p.157) is quite possibly an understatement. Furthermore, the impact on individual teachers can be very distressing: on receiving what they judge to be plagiarized work, instructors may “feel betrayed (by the student’s deception), angered (by the student’s laziness), and disappointed (by the student’s lack of learning)” (Valentine, 2006, p. 96), which can lead to “an overwhelming sense of disappointment and frustration” (Gullifer & Tyson, 2010, p. 464). Such comments typically have the ring of heart-felt expressions of worry and discouragement, and appear to be intended not only as complaints but also as constructive calls for positive action by the academic community: they underline the idea that, although the situation is grave, we can surely do better than just
“replacing the student-teacher relationship with the criminal-police relationship” (Howard, 2002, p. 47). Moreover, by outlining practical steps to improve the situation – as in, just to take a single example, the extensive work of Howard (e.g. 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, _inter alia_) – there are voices describing not only the problem but also a possible solution. But will such well-intentioned communication work the desired change?

On its own, quite possibly not. Surprisingly, even a reasonably convincing description of the problem along with a proposed solution might *not* in itself have much immediate effect on the practices of one’s colleagues: for instance, Elander, Pittman, Lusher, Fox and Payne (2010) report that a recent study of a project designed to improve student writing by increasing learners’ sense of their “authorial identity” (p. 139) revealed that, while the new academic experience led to a “significant improvement” in students’ confidence, knowledge and writing approaches (p. 167), it “did not… translate into significant reductions of staff perceptions of student writing behaviors, or reductions in the numbers of students suspected of plagiarism” (p. 168). This kind of disappointing broader outcome seems counter-intuitive, but there is a potential explanation.

Rogers (1995, pp. 7-8) recounts that at one time the danger of scurvy for sailors on long voyages was so severe that, during Vasco de Gama’s 1497 journey around the Cape of Good Hope, 100 of the 160 seamen died of the disease. Still, although there was a suspicion that lemon juice could avert this peril, the first serious test of that novel idea was not made until 1601, by a British captain who in fact had remarkable success. Even then, no further experiment occurred until 1747 – with excellent results again – at which point, “one would expect the British navy to adopt this … innovation” immediately (Rogers, 1995, p. 8). But this was not to be. The remedy was not officially adopted on British naval vessels until 1795. Moreover, the British merchant marine did not follow suit until 1865, 294 years after the first trial. As Rogers avers, “obviously more than just a beneficial innovation is necessary for its diffusion and adoption” (1995, p. 8). The moral of Rogers’ story is that “innovators” (1995, p. 263) who come up with an advantageous new idea may see few results unless and until they catch the attention of one or more “early adopters”, “respected” opinion-leaders who are not only confident enough to try something new but also sufficiently influential to bring others into the fold (p. 264). The public example of success by early adopters typically leads to relatively rapid acceptance by the “early majority”, followed by the more skeptical “late majority” and at that point, although the “laggards” may never join, the innovation will be in place (p. 265).

For Rogers, the spread of new ideas is “a special type of communication” that must be understood as “two-way”, rather than “linear” (1995, pp. 5-6). This crucial bidirectionality relates to the fact that, while an innovative concept may purport to reduce uncertainty by meeting a need or solving a problem, it also creates uncertainty because potential adopters will initially be unclear on how well the novel idea will actually work and what all of its positive and negative effects might be. Accordingly, while the innovator will naturally concentrate on communicating the “advantage” of the new idea, this benefit “is not always very clear-cut, at least not to the intended adopters” (1995, p. 13); therefore, the “innovation-decision process” necessarily also includes “information-seeking activities” on the part of adopters (p. 14). In other words, although innovators tend to “believe that advantageous innovations will sell themselves,” and that “the obvious benefits of a new idea will be widely realized by potential adopters, … [s]eldom is this the case” (1995, p. 7). In order for diffusion to succeed, Rogers postulates a number of key features of proposed innovations, two of which seem especially relevant to the change that concerns us here: “relative advantage” and “compatibility” (1995, p. 15). The first refers simply to “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes”, and the second to “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters” (Rogers, 1995, p. 15).
In light of this advice from Rogers, it is informative to examine an example of an argument for best practices with regard to academic-referencing guidance presented in a very recent article from a respected journal: Evering and Moorman (2012) outline a convincing rational for understanding that “plagiarism is a socially constructed concept that is not universally recognized” (p. 35). In so doing, they also provide insights into “why students plagiarize”, and they propose “proactive steps to prevent plagiarism” (Evering & Moorman, 2012, pp. 38, 39). As such, their article convincingly assembles many of the most thoughtful, moderate and constructive themes available in the literature on this topic; in other words, as Rogers (1995) would say, they certainly do advance suggestions which many of their writing-instructor colleagues would recognize as possessing “obvious benefits” (p. 7). However, despite its genuine merits, nowhere does the article seem explicitly to address relative-advantage or compatibility reasons in terms that might lead institutional opinion-leaders to adopt their perspective. Influential-early-adopter-oriented questions that are not addressed include, among others:

Compared to the present situation, what improvement in faculty worry, workload, and academic effectiveness will this change in approach bring about? Will such a change accord with faculty and institutional values around high-quality education better than the current combination of rules, detection and punishment? Given the vital need to reassure the public, will such an innovation announce institutional commitment to academic excellence more powerfully than present measures? Are there specific new strategies to alleviate a genuine problem in a cost-effective way? Most if not all such questions could of course be answered by making inferences from the article – and others like it – but none appears to receive focal attention.

This gap is especially important when Rogers’ concern for early adopters is juxtaposed with Reason’s separate but in fact rather congruent point that successful error control must address system – not just person – factors, which he specifically associates with engaging the responsibility of “managers” (2000, p. 394). Neither Reason nor Rogers refers to the other, but when the first emphasizes the need to reach improvements by taking account of system/management factors, and the second stresses the importance of motivating influential opinion-leaders, it is apparent that they are thinking in much the same way. Precisely what change-promoting steps will prove to be most successful is hard to predict – no doubt they will be diverse and context-specific – but surely they will have to incorporate communication that is directed not just to learners, or to peers who are already convinced, but also to institutionally influential early adopters. However, such a change in communication style may be difficult for those interested in plagiarism to achieve because, as Reason (1990) observes, when human beings face a situation that differs markedly from past experience, “frequency-gambling” is a typical response (p. 116). In that process, habitual strategies present themselves as at least “partially matched candidates” for application in the new context, with “selection… biased in favour of the more frequently-encountered items” (Reason, 1990, p. 115), which – in the case that concerns us here – almost certainly will not include taking account of Rogers’ unfamiliar advice regarding criteria for messages liable to move influential early adopters. Additionally, thinking of the two-way process of communication and uncertainty emphasized by Rogers (1996, pp. 6, 13-14), it is quite probable that wavering or highly conservative institutional responses to plagiarism could stem from the kind of “uncertainty” and “inadequate knowledge of [the] effects and side effects of planned actions” highlighted by Reason (1992, p. 76), so that opinion leaders may play it safe and just “fight the last war,’ i.e. … apply proven, HF [high-frequency] solutions to novel problems” that in fact can only be solved through the very innovations that are rejected (Reason, 1992, p. 76). This is the challenge.

Conclusion and Implications

Briefly, this discussion has aimed to review the debate around judgments of and responses to appropriate or inappropriate use of scholarly sources in academic writing, and – often by
introducing concepts from Reason (1990 and passim) in particular and, to a lesser extent, from Rogers (1995) – to propose potential extensions or refinements of current thinking, under six rubrics:

a) There are cognitive psychological reasons to suppose that students who claim to have been unaware of plagiarizing, but who nevertheless can readily recognize their error when it is later brought to their attention, may in fact be describing their experience accurately.

b) Similarly, there are justifications for not rushing hastily to the conclusion that it is very simple for responsible students to prevent circumstantial factors from contributing to poor performance of appropriate academic referencing.

c) While student protestations of not having clearly understood expectations for appropriate referencing may at times be self-serving, there are once again possible cognitive as well as academic foundations for crediting that claim.

d) The practice of patchwriting may be not only a normal and potentially positive process along the road to fully effective academic referencing, but also a somewhat predictable consequence of certain widely-practiced instructional strategies.

e) The extremely demanding nature of finely-tuned paraphrasing may be more fully appreciated through recognition of parallels between paraphrasing and translation, which is widely understood to be a very subtle skill that can take years to master.

f) Like other forms of human error, inappropriate paraphrasing of academic source materials – whether labeled as patchwriting, or designed in a less sympathetic way – may well be an inevitable feature of evolving performance, best suited to constructive management rather than angry and unrealistic efforts towards elimination.

Finally, and most important – in view of deriving the best advantage from any of the above six possibilities that are considered reasonable – it is very likely that the kind of broad institutional change that numerous writers recommend will only be attainable though a shift in communication focus:

g) While the value of methodical research, reporting, and exposition will of course never be in question, ultimate success may depend on increased awareness of the necessity to directly and meaningfully meet the communicative needs of influential early adopters, who – if they endorse a new approach to understanding and guiding student progress towards academically appropriate referencing – are in a position to “serve as a role model for many others” (Rogers, 1995, p. 264).

It is a truism that applied linguistics, especially in the sense of language teaching, is a domain of study and practice where many disciplines interconnect: aspects of linguistics itself interact with interests such as technology, media, psychology, sociology, politics and even economics. This discussion has attempted to support the utility of adducing a number of connections that may not have been taken into account before. While some of those proposals may well be judged too eccentric, or simply unhelpful, even arguing against them may cast light on matters of importance to language teachers. And if one or more suggestions are picked up and taken further, so much the better. In the spirit of appealing to early adopters who can move the profession forward, it should be noted that reflection on intersecting lines of research and theory is highly compatible with valued practices within the realm of applied linguistics. Moreover, successful efforts to deal with perceptions and misperceptions around plagiarism – which have caused such great distress
for students, instructors, administrators, and the general public – promise to address a problem whose effective reduction or solution is high on every group’s priority list.

References


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